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Terrible waste of a good idea (from Daniel T).
  • Daniel T. sent us the email below:

    Hi:

    Terrible waste of a good idea. I don't want to point out a very long list of problems, but the core of it is that you are following a path that requires a terribly big network of raw materials and people to make it work.

    Please don't write me off as some troll clubbing your ideas, I should explain that I am a Master metalsmith , welder , machinist {pre CNC}. Thirty years of making things using old low tech material and methods. I jokingly tell my students that I wanted to be a planetary colonist and found Earth was the only available choice.

    I have made metal from ore and tell people that I can make almost anything that was made before 1900. All that said , there is one rule of thumb I use describing progress in tech. No matter how much time a piece of new tech seams to save , you pay for it with larger infrastructure needed to support it , total number of people goes up , need for connection and transport goes up. You are stuck in that same problem. I tried once to estimate the minimum number of people it would take to have a modern tech world and stopped at 40 million people ,without covering all bases.

    Bye
    Daniel T.
    Blacksmith
     
  • 39 Comments sorted by
  • I'm just a laymen. I might not have it right but thats how i understand it

    saved time is payed for with infrastructure until the infrastructure loops back on itself (machines automatically assembling and maintaining machines), then the amount of infrastructure needed can be shrunk and instead be payed for with energy plus ideas/information.
     
  • Imagine a situation where a group of people own a GVCS which provides some percentage of their needs, say 20%, and the rest is covered by ordinary day jobs. This now provides social insurance. If you lose your day job, you simply switch to working for the GVCS projects till you find another day job. The social benefits could be vast if people didn't have to worry about losing a job or home so much.

    The letter writer may be right about not being able to close the system 100% as far as parts, material, and labor. I don't think it has to, though. It only needs to provide enough to make a difference, and then you do outside work or trade for the rest. If you can just cover housing and food, you are at 50% of what most people need, and can then work half as much to cover the rest, or save up and live off the savings with much less than "full retirement savings".
     
  • Kudos to Daniel. Too many people seem to think that the GVCS will exist completely independently from the world at large. Maybe eventually, but right now we can piggyback off of existing capital to help bootstrap the process. Who cares if we can't make hydraulic valves and tubing, that doesn't matter. If you have a lot of productive value in terms of energy, food, etc you can buy specific items off the shelf, that isn't cheating. OSE is about shortening the supply chain dramatically, reorganizing the use of capital and the increasing the efficient distribution of production.

    I'm gonna write an essay about the implications of OSE eventually haha.
     
  • We need a rigorous economic and ergonomic analysis of Daniel T's text, based on real data and scientific inquiry.

    See the page on our current Research Needs.
     
  • OSE and the GVCS project could not exist without the foundation of our globally-connected tehnologically driven civilization. To think of it as a separate entity is to ignore the fact that it is part and product of that civilization.
    Yes, we can buy hoses and valves and motors. Or we can scavenge what we need from the corpse of that civilization. Either way, those items exist and we can use them. We don't have to smelt iron from ore for our design for a tractor or the CEB press to be valid.
    But _KNOWING THAT WE COULD_ smelt ore (or whatever), should we _need_ to, makes me happy, at the same time I hope I never have to smelt ore in order to build the tools I need NOW.
    To me, GVCS is aimed at those people who "get" the idea and those who need the help it will offer. Those who wouldn't live in a CEB house won't buy one... they'll consume "normal" items, and more power to them.
    But when we show what's possible at what price, when you take out the profit motive and factor in sweat-equity and the force-multiplier of open-source technology, I think we're all going to see that the divide between the haves and have-nots gets smaller.
    And that's why I want to work on this project... to bring the have-nots closer to the haves, not by tearing down the haves, but by giving the have-nots the tools they need to better their own situation by their own efforts.
    ~Rick
     
  • I have read Daniel's letter several times and an easy response seems apparent to me.

    Before I continue, let me stress that I am grateful for the letter. Not only has it provided a format for this conversation, I am assuming it was written out of a desire for the betterment of humanity. I have every reason to believe that Daniel T. is my superior. I hope that none of this post comes across as flaming/bashing.

    The OSE request for an academician to assess the issue and respond seems to me to be a potential waste of a great resource. There are many more significant areas of contribution waiting. As we begin to create the tools for a micro-revolution, there will be a push-back; it is necessary to respond with appropriate energy.

    I will do my best to respond to the content of the letter, but I do feel responsible to note the tone of the email as well. Please do not perceive this as aggression or an attack, I am a strong advocate against evil speech.

    The first two paragraphs seem to me to be cynical and elitist. If there is a good idea, then its usage is constrained by its environment. More precisely, the only waste of a good idea is to not act upon it. How is creating the GVCS a terrible waste of the idea to create the GVCS? Moreover, of course it requires a large network, the site says as much. The communities will be designed to integrate into a world economy and aid in decentralization. A 200 member community could not presently replace NASA, an oil rig or a strip mine. However, forming a 200 member community with the GVCS can enable a group of refugees to change their focus from mere survival to elevation.

    An unverified recitation of qualifications is ad hominem at best. I could make a long list of all my amazing skills, but it has no impact of the quality of what I have to say. The joy of the wikisphere is that it allows contributions from everyone, granted, all contributions are not created equal, but each contribution stands on its own merit. In the past, my survival plan was running off into the woods with a bug-out bag, or if that were not possible, a sharp knife. However, I began to realize that while primitivism and survival skills are useful things, they have a tendency to breed a type of independence that disconnects one from meaningful impact on others. There is the familiar maxim revisited, "If a survivalist falls in the woods and no one hears him, does he make a noise?"

    It is my personal belief that the value of individual human contribution and existence needs to be weighed according to three characteristics. The first is hedonistic, to what degree did they have joy and experience beauty? The second is altruistic, what did they give to the people around them? The third is transcendental, what did they contribute to humanity as a whole?

    There is the claim of the ability to make anything from before 1900, I recognize that this is directed at items related to his skills, so I will not ask questions about an herbal remedy for a headache, a glass bowl or a baby, nor will I joke around about making the "discovery" of America. But I think there is an important fact that can be derived from humor. In thinking linearly about what different things were made before 1900, one can think equally of revolution and evolution. Can you make the Renaissance, or perhaps more appropriately, can you make a world that thinks it is flat and does not know about the Americas? Is the humanity of modern times the humanity pre-1900? No.

    The Open Source Economy (Yochai Benkler) is something totally new, it will require new paradigms.

    An estimation of the minimum people required to make a "modern tech world" reminds me of the famous mathematical quote, "98.743% of all statistics are made up on the spot." Interconnectivity is an essential characteristic of our rapidly globalizing world. Eventually we will have a network exceeding 4.3 billion. The future always seems impossible when judged against the past.

    I could say more, but I feel the length of my post already borders on abusing the good nature of OSE readers.
     
  • Daniel makes good points if the perspective is pre-CNC.

    The advantage of mechanisation and automation is that it obviates both the training, labour and time of manual work. Any calculation into the "Minimum requirements for civilisation" will be wildly inaccurate and inappropriate if the available level of mechanisation is not taken into account.

    Bearing that in mind, consider that Daniel is writing by his own account as a pre-CNC machinist; his experience is of the time and effort investment in manual labour. There's nothing wrong with that perspective as it applies to manual labour. However the GVCS is a project that employs and enables mass-mechanisation and automation on a scale that the first world largely rejected for labour-protection reasons, and the third-worlds for cost/availability.

    I will take the example of mass-producing toys for direct sale to customers. A toy manufacturer might chime in saying that it's impossible to do this cheaply or with only a team of five people without outsourcing production to a factory in china at great up-front capital cost. However, anyone on this forum is probably familiar with 3D printing technology and other methods of rapid, on-demand manufacture. These technologies are not new, but patents held them away from the individual for twenty years (a good example, as an aside, of patents limiting the vision of an inventor to a cloistered market due to guaranteed monopoly). Now that they are available to the individual, it's *very* feasible to start manufacturing products for direct sale, whether it is phone cases, toys, robots or otherwise, without any up front capital investment and with a team of as little as 1.

    Apply that outward. Mechanisation, Automation and Accessibility are the keywords (where Open Source is a key element of true accessibility) that power this trend of removing intermediaries and personnel requirements. An open-source, easily constructed and operated, automatic hydroponic garden, for example, could perform the task of fifty conventional farmers. That's 49 fewer people required for the critical civil task of food provision; 49 people who can perform other critical roles, such as monitoring or administering the power supplies, transport routes and information networks that form modern society's backbones.

    Society has often feared mechanisation and automation as a force that "destroys jobs", but in any healthy society with healthy attitudes to creative work, people will find useful things to do with their time. The challenge is simply in changing the worldview from valuing only "paying" jobs to valuing valuable jobs. Let the GVCS do the hard work, and free society time to form culture.
     
  • My background is in mathematics and sociology, so I'm hearing a few
    important aspects of Daniel T.'s concerns that aren't being addressed. I
    don't suppose to speak for him, I just see a point beside him.
    I'd love to provide whatever framework and insight I can, toward that
    'economic/ergonomic' analyst position you mentioned, Elifarley. :)



    System
    logistics have a few subtle ('overlooked', not 'difficult to grasp')
    things to say about the DIY localization movement, and the GVCS in
    particular: small networks do not have the critical demand needed for
    marginal gains; complexity is ergodic, not 'a singularity'; risk, loss,
    and coordination costs quickly dampen and shorten networks; and Malthusian
    collapse is a component of system fidelity. Gosh, I hope that doesn't
    sound catastrophic. I really do mean it in the best possible way.
    (honest! I explain further down...)





    Small Networks Don't Lay Transatlantic Fiber


    No one here (I hope!) is advocating that everyone build their own
    tractor; recycling Maoist 'self-sufficiency' isn't a path to creative
    freedom. The metric of success, for GVCS and any OS toolkit, is the
    expansion of human liberty, community, and possibility. So, from a logistical standpoint, what is the benefit of being able to build any
    tool you need? A machine shop requires some work. True, there is a comfort in just knowing you can always
    create what you need, so you aren't likely to lack. Your own efforts
    determine your potential, (Eudaimonia!) and your impact is magnified by
    collaboration, but will there be greater possibility? Ecology is a
    good model of this system problem: how does the diversity of a mainland
    compare to that of many islands? Parallels with the
    globalization/localization 'schism' are numerous, and I'll address a
    few. As a rightly grandiose tome of these problems, and the tools
    to solve them, I offer: Stephen P. Hubbell's "The Unified Neutral
    Theory of Biodiversity and Biogeography". For now, I'll make crude
    analogies with economics, while slurring and gesturing toward Hubbell.
    :)  Back to the question: it turns out, equal area and energy density
    mainlands will have fewer total species than many islands, but that's
    because each island has local variations of the same low-troph
    generalists and niches. They 'count' as different species, because
    they're not compatible. But, the ecological depth is greater on
    the mainland, expressing a greater variety of functional forms. If
    'species' are the genetically incompatible subsets of life, let's call
    'telosies' the unique functional contributions of life. Mainlands have
    greater trophic depth, but does that guarantee more telosies? And is more
    all we want? The metric was: liberty, community, possibility;
    possibility expands when new forms and combinations enable new events. A
    'black swan' appears. That event criteria is critical: while islands
    can have greater telosies of a certain type (say, varieties of medicinal
    herb), they lack others (large herbivores). Islands are constrained by
    the size of the network. An elephant is actually a small niche; ants
    outweigh elephants, and have much higher metabolisms. To survive,
    an elephant has to travel, collecting its limited supply from diverse
    locations. No go, on an island. You need a critical network size, to support the structurally
    new telosies. These marginal species, and the telosies they support,
    are first to collapse if energy density or range drop. Nietzsche
    supposed that the eagle is strong, to devour mice; but mice are strong
    enough to live abundantly, suffer at the hands of the eagle, and STILL
    outlast it. (Dominance generates parasitism and collapse; fidelity is continuing to be.)
    Anyway, islands overlap diversity, and reduce compatibility. Mainlands
    allow structurally new telosies, and greater possibility (like, say,
    multicellular organisms... or satellite communication).
     
  • Evolution Is Blind... And Dumb



    If you read too much futurist Apocrypha, it can be tempting to assume
    that technology is "accelerating". Don't be fooled. The entire theme of
    acceleration is evolution, muddled. The first mistake is a misnomer: we
    say that "the fit survive", but that doesn't mean there are fit
    organisms, to survive. Evolution expands in every allowed direction
    (ontological restrictions are another important point), and if any
    of them survive... duh, they're the fit ones. We happen to be so lucky,
    3.6 billion years have passed without a simultaneous crash. But, we've
    come appallingly close: the P-T and K-T extinctions are good examples of
    how you can be 'moving forward' off a cliff. And, consider what a
    'singularity' means ecologically: if we introduce functional diversity
    equivalent to hundreds of millions of years of species variation, we're
    taking all those minute probabilities of self-induced collapse, and
    crashing them into a moment. I doubt anything like that will happen, but
    if it does, the probability of collapse should rise to 1. Even with a
    moderate rate of mutation, our microbial ancestors' harvest was 100
    million years of Snowball Earth. In contrast, nukes aren't so bad.
    Global warming would make us dino-friendly. Neither is likely to
    extinguish ALL life, let alone humanity. There's no guarantee that
    things are getting better, though. 'Fit' organisms are the set of all
    survivors. This includes a lot of stragglers who made it on dumb luck.
    If times get easy, mildly deleterious mutations accumulate - until the
    population's mean fitness has dropped, so that selection exceeds mutation rate. Evolution doesn't 'keep making things fitter, better, faster, stronger' - it piles mutations on until a species can barely
    survive. That is actually the best chance for survival, because
    mutation is the first step in searching the functional landscape. That's
    were the next mistake comes in: natural 'selection'. Before Darwin gets
    to pick his favorites, there's an ontological constraint: any new
    mutation has to be viable, conception onward. And, most 'selection'
    occurs during these early stages. Mutations in these fundamental
    components aren't tolerated, and the result is a biochemically and
    physiologically constrained space. (You can't have an Ordon Goat - their
    horns don't have a viable growth cycle!) So, there are only a few forms
    at each scale that an organism can take, ignoring the bells and
    whistles. Generally, an ecology will express as much of this ontological
    tree as it can, regardless of relative fitness of form. (A fitter form
    will have greater local abundance and biomass, but parasitism, disease,
    and other factors keep it from squashing the marginal forms that share
    its niche.) The greater the energy density (think Montreal vs. Manaus)
    and the greater the total range (Galapagos vs. Gambia), the greater the
    diversity of expressed forms. (What does that say, for a
    moderate-but-not-overwhelming adoption of OSE?) If energy density or
    range increases, more marginal forms appear (each with lower return,
    lower resilience to shock). Economies and technology are following the
    same path: a given level of energy abundance can support a given trophic
    depth and 'telosy' (sp?) diversity. To get back to the ergodic concept:
    once the 'gas' of industrialization has fully expanded, we will wander
    across the technology and economy surface aimlessly, swapping between
    forms without increasing diversity, just like Nature has done since
    flowers evolved. We might pop up to another level, as when sexual
    reproduction captured diversity after the Earth melted, but these leaps
    are primarily a result of increasing energy density and range,
    not a source of them. (The Jevons Paradox, and his Icelandic SUVs, are a
    fun tangent.) I'd love to go in-depth on this, but I'll leave it as a
    summary of concept, and get into the details in another post.







    "I'll Give You My Wool, If You Find Me a Horse"



    Localization creates islands of interaction, lowering transport
    distance, which lowers demand for transport infrastructure. If all I
    need comes from my town, why would I need the internet? It uses 10% of
    US power, for Tesla's sake! Some things require huge resources, and
    localization would raise transport and coordination costs beyond the
    market. Generally, I'll call the costs of resource availability, labor,
    capital, and material inputs as 'production costs', and the costs of
    transport to warehousing and retail, advertising, management, finance,
    as well as consumer engagment in the market, I'll call 'allocation
    costs'. A rough study of mine back in 2001 showed over 65% of the
    American workforce engaged in services for 'allocation costs' - that is,
    two thirds of us don't make anything; we help decide how much of what
    gets made, who gets it, and how much it costs. That seems like a huge
    waste, to me, but it's not clear that localization would be an
    improvement. Without demand for excessive transport, the marginal cost
    of transport rises, and many-chain networks tend to collapse as
    transaction costs overwhelm them. Without the importation architectures,
    even regional trade would be more piecemeal, slower, generating a lower
    return, leading to lower future investment, and withering as people
    prefer to find 'local solutions'. Much has been written on the value of
    large, accessible collaborations, and the polynomial increase in
    connectivity possible (though our psychology limits our stored
    connectivity, we can hop along chains, retaining 20, 50, or even 100 of
    our Dunbar allowances as distant nodes). Consider localization as the
    logistical opposite. Not to say that globalization is great; we need to
    improve the relative allocation of local and global goods. Shoes
    don't need to be made in another country, but I understand if there are
    only a couple places with the newest computer chip fab. The critical
    concept is built on the preceding arguments about network behavior: if
    transaction costs rise, it is equivalent to a lower 'energy density',
    and this will be followed by a decline in supported diversity. The drop
    in diversity will, paradoxically, probably lead to a momentary gross
    increase in economy; local standards of living will be higher. But this
    is because there is a greater return on local, over global investments.
    Once the local investments are saturated, the global infrastructure has
    little demand to resurrect it. Without connectivity of associations and
    transportation, a cul de sac is reached. China went through exactly this
    process in the 15th century. The first great experiment with printed
    money became the discovery of hyperinflation, and China's resultant
    credit upheaval made risk and uncertainty paramount. The result was a
    decline in the willingness to invest in large projects. Coupled with new
    crops, and a reactive bureaucracy - the city laborers saw new
    opportunity in moving 'out west' to the feet of the Tian Shan, to live
    happily as farmers. Unfortunately, cottage industry substituted for city
    industry demand, so factories were abandoned. And disperse populations
    required less food and material transport, so roads and canals fell into
    disrepair. Finally, a distant and diffuse population is harder to tax,
    so the anemic Qing were no match for a few British guns. (Imagine if
    Mongke had faced them in that state!) Even if production costs drop,
    they may encourage a system of allocation which is too dispersive,
    unraveling the benefits of city agglomeration. Remember: the individual
    may be happy to 'move forward' into this cul de sac. Evolution doesn't
    say there have to be winners.

     
  • Pick Your Parasite



    Ecology displays a few consistent structural roles: Primary Producers
    (Photosynth), Consumers (Herbaceous), Higher Order Consumers
    (Carnivorous), Omnivores, and Parasites. Plants need nutrient cycles,
    and the clearance and disturbance of overgrown regions. They benefit
    from disruption; recovery and succession patches become micro-habitats,
    allowing greater diversity. Herbivores make this happen, and do a lot
    else, besides. Carnivores keep the herbivores from overwhelming plants,
    and Omnivores switch their consumption pattern to whatever is locally
    abundant, acting as a damp on population cycles. Parasitism manages the
    whole system. For example, every kind of insect in the Amazon has its
    own variety of cordyceps fungus, which cuts a swath of zombie-geddon
    through any species that attains local abundance. This ensures that, to
    avoid excessive parasitism, insects will over-speciate. When energy
    density allows, parasites balance multiple species on the same niche.
    Perhaps more importantly, after extinctions, expanding populations are
    relatively homogenous, until regional isolation allows genetic drift to
    disrupt compatibility. Parasites spread through these clone-herds,
    shifting the pressures of selection away from food, mates, and safety,
    toward the dumb luck of immunity and circumstance. Small, isolated
    pockets of survivors, with random and diverse mutations, become those
    isolated, drifting gene pools. The flu helps rejuvenate speciation after
    extinction. The pattern holds in economies: if a mode or mandate
    becomes dominant, parasitism drives its collapse, fragmentation, and
    diversification, until the equilibrium species distribution is reached.
    Parasites also raise the mortality rate, which lets the mutation rate
    slide higher (it wants to hover just under mortality), allowing more
    lucky fools to live, which means the world isn't as vicious a place to
    live. You can survive, even if your carapace is covered in a huge antler
    that you only use for hoisting rival males. Try hiding in a tunnel,
    with one of those! These 'bells and whistles' are a way to avoid
    parasitism: pick as 'desirable' traits that are fatal, so only the
    strongest will survive to display them. And, while the ecology as a
    whole wouldn't mind our cyclic collapse, you might not want your
    grandchildren to suffer. My advice is: pick a parasite that works for
    you. Limits to growth can increase fidelity, and if you refuse to limit
    your own growth, the ecology will do it for you. Does this mean
    localization is great, or that we're stuck with it whether or not we
    want it? Answer, briefly - I think we have potential to 'tame &
    tend' our way into a symbiotic ecology. Omnivores can be gardeners,
    sampling many kinds, gathering all together. We're migratory social omnivores,
    so if we can't manage a new parasitism, I don't think there's a
    phylogenetic branch that can. I'm happy to elaborate on all of this, and
    engage in tangents and discussions of every stripe. I'll leave you with
    a visualization:








    Imagine a world were local communities can supply all their needs,
    without highways or telecom industries. What beautiful, empowering
    activities would we pursue? My guess:




    "Dude, did you hear? The farmers down by the river - the ones with all
    that free time, built a stone pyramid! It's huge, and they have parties
    with this trippy drink - we should totally go, it'll be a pilgrimage!"
















    As an addendum (ugh!), half the world lives in cities, and many of the
    rest hope to move there soon. Without a plan for urban populations of
    Chinese proportions, GVCS will be a solution to the wrong problem.
    Further addendum! (These really should be essays; I'll get to work on a
    draft for y'all.) The underlying logic of all this is a powerful concept
    and a damning problem: allocation. Scarcity or no, we are still only
    staunching the wound of dis-allocation. Cybernetics a la Norbert, in
    vol. 2 - adieu!

     
  • Eck. Sorry for the poor formatting. N00B
     
  • @Anthonyrepetto I think you made some good points, but I do not know because I got a few sentences into it before I threw in the towel.  Is there any way you can say everything that you did in those four massive posts in 5 sentences?
     
  • I mourn the loss of your attention span, ARGH.  In sum:

    1.  Evolution will always win
    2.  We may not fall into the category of most fit
    3.  Mutation is important to evolution
    4.  There are constraints on evolution - ontology shapes the selection space
    5.  Localization is good for some things, bad for others

    - Mark
     
  • Hehehe. Dear ARGH, I feel a paradox coming on: should I simply state conclusions, with no argument, or include the argument, and to what degree should I provide examples and resources in support of it?

    And, thank you, Mark! I've been meaning to continue our conversation; I poked about your consulting website - I'm impressed, and would love to work with you on a few bits of OS software. I've got a killer recognition algorithm you might find interesting. But, I should also attempt ARGH's request:

    1) Globalize/Localize is a false dichotomy; both extremes are maladaptive, and the problem is allocation between them.
    2) Evolution doesn't care if it leads to extinction, and will devolve species to the minimum necessary.
    3) 'Advanced' technologies are the result of energy abundance, not the cause.
    4) Individuals will happily march toward system-wide cul de sacs.
    5) Parasitism fragments any dominant forms, either through collapse, or by encouraging other limits to growth.

    There's a lot more to it, but if you need five take-home blurbs, those sound bites will work. :)  I'll have a few more detailed monstrosities every day, so it's a good idea to practice note-taking and outlining, if that's what you need.
     
  • I think you miss the point.  We are not trying to go back to 1900.  Computers and electronics play a big role in what we are doing and what we are going to do.  We might be able to craft printed circuitboards but we will never be able to craft components and chips.  It will be ok because these things are small and lightweight it makes less sense to localize them.
     
  • @Anthonyrepetto
    Dear ARGH, I feel a paradox coming on: should I simply state conclusions, with no argument, or include the argument, and to what degree should I provide examples and resources in support of it? 

    I would assert (and not just for the sake of people with little free time or ADHD) that it would be worthwhile to begin with conclusions, most points probably do not need argued.  If something does not require argument, then what is the motive for arguing it?  (Brevity is the only thing that impresses me.)  Regardless, if you want to post a massive post, give us a little outline at the top.  Not only is this good practice for wiki contributions, but it let's people decide if they want to devote time and energy to reading through everything.
     
  • We can probably make ICs and such if we really want to.  I know I do, but that's not currently part of the OSE movement here.

    I see OSE as part of a trend I decided to add to myself.  Over time, technology has developed a critical mass, industrializing the world and bringing economies of scale to processes and products.  Computers helped enable the other side of the curve.

    Blacksmithing led to the author's machinist work.  Over time, CNC technology automated that work and changed the number and type of people used in it.  Later, that tech led to other disruptive technologies, like 3D printing.  That technology is helping to enable the next part of the trend, replicating the machines themselves.  Information technology, mostly enabled by computers, is doing more, allowing knowledge such as how to build your own tractor from basic parts to be spread far and wide.

    The machinist will be replaced by an artisan again, with a machine in his garage that takes scrap in, and spits out product.  The doctor will have a greenhouse, with at least some genetically modified plants to produce various medicines--the herbalist of old.  The chemist, author, etc. will join in too.  I'm not sure what the major occupation will be rather than an agrarian society like in old times, but the decentralization of production will be complete.  Blacksmith to million dollar CNC machine to fabber machine.

    I see this as a cycle of civilization.  Ingenuity builds an industrial revolution, which then creates the tools for free men to reverse the trend.  Given another breakthrough in technology and science, we might see it again.
     
  • @ARCHaynes: "give us a little outline at the top."

    "
    small networks do not have the critical demand needed for

    marginal gains; complexity is ergodic, not 'a singularity'; risk, loss,

    and coordination costs quickly dampen and shorten networks; and Malthusian

    collapse is a component of system fidelity."

    You'll notice, I did exactly that. Each statement here was elaborated as a separate header, allowing you to skip ahead, or skip the whole thing. I do appreciate critique, but you should try reading what I wrote, first.
     

  • My apologies, I had not realized that that sentence was intended to help anyone make sense of the following text.  I must assert that anyone using words like 'ergodic' and 'Malthusian' or giving semi-poetic titles loosely connected to the topics of each section is far more concerned with impressing than with communicating effectively.

    Also, believe me, I did try.
     
  • @ARGHanyes:

    Honestly, this is silly. I explained repeatedly in the text that I'm happy to discuss, clarify, and hear out other views on the topic. You aren't addressing the topic, however; you take issue with the length and phrasing. Would you like to talk about ergotism and Malthus? If you're on the forum, you have access to Wikipedia and Google; I didn't bother to include links or detailed references to concepts that are explained by a quick search. I can copy and paste, or include links to them, if you would like. Asking for that is better than complaining about not understanding.

    More importantly, when Elifarley posted the link to Daniel T.'s response on the Research Needs page (that's how I found it, btw), he stated: "We need a rigorous economic and ergonomic analysis of Daniel T's text, based on real data and scientific inquiry."

    Rigor, economy, ergonomics, analysis, real data, scientific inquiry - I hope anyone looking for those things won't be deterred by my use of names and concepts developed for and related to them. Again, if you have questions or comments about the content of my post, I'd love to chat.
     
  • @Anthonyrepetto, I acknowledge that I am probably coming across as silly.  Allow me to re-rephrase.  It appears that I am not intelligent, educated or experienced enough to understand your points in the fashion that you made them.  However, I would enjoy having the opportunity to understand your points and maybe discuss them.  Ergotism brought up an article on poisoning and ergodic theory brought up an article that made no sense to me.

    This is my take-away from reading each of your sections, it should shed some light on my confusion.

    1- A complex system requires a big network.
    2- I'm honestly not sure on this point, though I read it twice.
    3- Not buying things from far away means we have less things close by.
    4- I'm not sure about this one either, but it seems to deal with people being dumb.

    Looking at your sound bytes:
    1) Globalize/Localize is a false dichotomy; both extremes are maladaptive, and the problem is allocation between them. 
    2) Evolution doesn't care if it leads to extinction, and will devolve species to the minimum necessary. 
    3) 'Advanced' technologies are the result of energy abundance, not the cause. 
    4) Individuals will happily march toward system-wide cul de sacs. 
    5) Parasitism fragments any dominant forms, either through collapse, or by encouraging other limits to growth.
    I am having difficulty connecting them to OSE specifically.  Point one makes sense, and I agree.  I am unsure on the point being made with point two. Point three makes sense, free time enables us to figure out how to get more free time.  I am unsure what you mean by point four or five.

    Again I apologize for my inability to digest information as you present it.  Everyone taking the role of teacher has to deal with the stupid kid, you got me.
     
  • @ARGHanyes: Thank you. :)  I don't think you're stupid, and I see that leaving 'ergodic' undefined was a stumbling block I could have avoided. After tutoring for years, I've never had a stupid kid to teach - the understanding I create is the measure of my competence as a teacher. So, I'll clean up the confusions I created:

    First, I'll go back to the context for all those odd statements: systems theory. Systems theory is the study of how energy or stuff moves around a network. The focus is on the pattern of behavior, not the stuff shuffling about. If, as a system evolves ('evolves' means 'changes through time', not 'gets better'), the stuff tends to concentrate in a few spots, we call them 'attractors'. (Chaos theory is the study of systems with many 'strange attractors' - they're sometimes even positioned in a fractal, so the flow of the system has many layers of patterns.)  Systems that spread all their stuff out, like a gas, are called thermodynamic. It's important to relate this to entropy: 'higher entropy' means the system is close to its average (or final) state. When a gas reaches its 'final state' of equal pressure, each molecule in it is equally likely to travel in any direction, and over time, will wander through the whole space with equal probability. That's called 'ergodic motion' - you wander between states of equal entropy, never stopping, never compressing, no longer expanding. Contrast that with an 'attractive' system: as time goes on, stuff wanders into the attractors, and can't escape fast enough. There's a pile-up, and flow ends up concentrated in those attractors, or along the paths that lead between them. If the final attractors absorb ALL the stuff in the system, you have a 'singularity'. I pour marbles down a funnel, and, regardless of their particular paths, they all wander down the hole eventually.

    We've only been making a serious study of systems since Norbert Wiener, Turning, & von Neumann laid out information theory, game theory, and theories of noise & control. We still haven't developed the ability to predict system behavior, over the long term. Pure math seemed like the best route, especially after Nash figured out 'equilibrium' (that is, 'high-entropy') strategies for games that lack a single best choice. (His solution: pick each choice with a certain probability; some may be 0%, but the blend as a whole is better than always choosing the same one.) Unfortunately, when John Holland and the computer-modeling crews tried to apply these rules to real systems, they failed. Weather models from the 70's and 80's are classic flops. Nobody tries to use genetic algorithms for serious optimization problems. And 'neural networks' are incredibly bloated, requiring huge sets of practice data, to learn. Our best data set, and our best model, is the world around us: ecology is the most complex and resilient system we've found. If we want resilient complexity, Nature is our mentor. So, in my old post, I outlined a number of parallels between ecology and technological economies; those were the headers and blubs. I'll go over them differently, and illustrate how they apply. Hopefully, I'll make sense. :)

    (I'll post as separate chunks; each one addresses a different aspect.)
     
  • The gunky old version: "small networks do not have the critical demand needed for
    marginal gains." Now, extended rephrasing:









    Picture the links between everyone on earth. Some folks are meeting and
    sharing with many others; some are ascetic hermits. When a group of
    people, however small, has many connections between them, their
    network is 'well-connected', or 'dense'. Like the Oracle of Bacon, a
    dense network can find a path between any two members in just a few
    steps. When many people are connected to each other on a network, that
    network is 'large'. The network may be very 'sparse',
    though - it takes many steps to connect you to a random member. Humans
    have limited time and attention, so we choose between being
    well-connected to a few people, versus loosely connected to many; and we
    choose between a large network, and a small one. These choices
    don't automatically conflict: if I'm on a large network, I can hop from
    chain to chain along it, and form close, well-connected relationships
    with folks from very different places. (Yay, internet!) Big network,
    well-connected.









    In ecology, we can look at well- and poorly-connected, large
    and small, in all their variety. Let's start with big vs. small: Gambia
    (central West Africa) is pretty small, but it's a lot bigger than the
    Galapagos islands. And, it's surrounded by places similar to it. While
    the Galapagos have unique species, they don't have a huge diversity.
    Gambia is part of a larger network, a 'mainland', so it can
    support species that wouldn't have enough territory to live in the
    Galapagos. Elephants, for example, travel through these areas for food.
    If Gambia was a chain of islands, the elephants would have to work too
    hard to get food, and that extra cost would steal the energy needed to
    support a large population. Without at least a few elephants, the
    population would inbreed & fluctuate, and the first drought or
    tsunami would be
    their extinction. So, to survive for any reasonable amount of time,
    there must be a minimum population. For a bug, that minimal population
    can be tiny; a few pounds of flies have more genetic diversity than you
    need, to support a fly niche. So, even tiny islands can feed a
    population of flies. For elephants, the minimal population has a huge
    biomass: you'll need hundreds of tonnes of elephant, to keep a stable
    population. A tiny island doesn't have enough food for a herd.









    So what, for OSE? Vaguely, the more folks involved in
    OSE, the larger the 'mainland' becomes. If only ten
    people were into OSE, I probably wouldn't find an RPG & Lego
    aficionado among them. But, with hundreds of folks involved, there are
    probably enough D&D nerds for regular adventures. With 10,000 members, we'd have an OSE Role Playing Club. This
    is a small niche, but if the network is large enough, it can feed a
    stable population. That's the primary value of cities: in New York,
    you're more likely to find someone who'll buy your odd little specialty
    items, compared to North Dakota. New York is a 'mainland' supporting marginal species. ('Marginal' isn't the same as 'niche'; a
    niche is when you need a specific resource, while a marginal species is one that consumes a tiny fraction
    of the energy in the ecology. It can only appear when the mainland is
    large enough for those tiny fractions, together, to feed a stable
    population. Eagles eat a variety of animals - they're not a niche
    species. But they patrol a huge range, to gather enough
    food, and would die out if confined. That's 'marginal'.) Back to OSE:
    marginal tech has lower yields and fewer
    applications. Not many folks need it. If OSE gets big, it can make kits
    for marginal needs. If OSE stays small, we'd meet primary demands, and
    ignore the
    'side projects'. And, if OSE was big, then shrank, the 'marginal' tools
    would be first to go. Keep growing, and diversity to follow.









    Before addressing dense vs. sparse networks, I'll indulge a tangent. We
    talk about 'the value of the network' - the value of connecting to
    diversity, through fewer steps, and accesing a larger pool of resources.
    Networks are hyped for creating new combinations between previously
    disconnected folks. With just two people in a group, there's one
    connection open between them. Add a third person, and they allow
    two new bonds, one to each of the pair. Every new person adds the
    POTENTIAL
    for as many new connections as the size of the whole network. (the 200th
    person adds 199
    connections...)  This is a polynomial: for n people, there are at
    most n(n-1)/2 connections. If each new connection was guaranteed, and
    had value equal to the old connections, then new members
    would add polynomially to 'the value of the network'.
    Sadly, the 300 millionth person to join the internet doesn't bother
    connecting to all 300 million users, so the portion of links made drops
    as the network grows. And the folks who joined first saw greatest value
    in the network; noobs use the network once it's 'barely worth their
    time'. That
    means, gain in value for new members drops as the network grows.
    (The old timers keep accruing some value
    from the influx of noobs, but a horde of youtubers isn't worth a few
    more Wiki moderators.)  So, at BEST, a network's value
    grows as n^2 (kinda good), but as the network gets really big,
    connectivity and value lurch. This is a diminishing return on
    growth. Eventually, return on growth drops below the costs of
    risk and inconvenience. The network stops growing. If members have a
    limited number of links (say, the 150
    folks that, according to Dunbar, you can have a personal attachment to,
    before you forget them, or they become 'two-dimensional' to you), then
    network value grows rapidly as you approach a power
    of this number. (The exact exponent depends on the diversity of
    value-streams in the network... I'll bother going into that if folks are
    curious. 150^4 is about half a billion.) Once this size is reached, the
    value of new members, and the pull for growth, drops off quickly. The
    shape of the relationship between 'Number of Existing Members' and
    'Value of New Membership' follows what's called an S-curve. Flat at
    first, it seems to rise 'exponentially', then flattens again once the
    limit is reached.









    This is why species diversity doesn't spiral up to infinity. Eventually,
    the marginal value of a new species is too small to feed . And,
    similarly, we can't expect technological
    diversity to spiral up to infinity. Diversity on earth shot up when we
    absorbed mitochondria, when sexual reproduction took over, and when
    flowers co-evolved with pollinator species. Those rare events created
    new network dynamics (there were new 'value-streams'), so diversity
    quickly spiked to its new limit. Once biodiversity hit those limits,
    however, it hovered there for hundreds of millions of years. New species
    came and went, but the total diversity stopped increasing. Humans were
    the first migratory social omnivores, and we use tools, so we're kinda
    like a new flower. We quickly spread over the earth, and turned things
    into diverse species of tool and patterns of behavior. But our tool and
    norm diversity has a limit, too. And, when we reach it, we'll continue
    swapping new species of tool in for the old, but the total diversity
    will stagnate. (This is the critical point for my later statement, that
    "complexity is ergodic, not 'a singularity'.")









    Next: Wrapping up "small networks &
    marginal gains", I'll explain the difference between dense vs. sparse webs, and relate that to demand for infrastructure! :)
     
  • Ah, it formats oddly when I have to copy text into the Comment Box. Is there an easy way around this?
     
  • That explanation makes complete sense to me.  

    Please tell me if these points that I semi-deduced from your post are logical/accurate.

    We see that a major technological breakthrough will result in an explosion of new inventions and will drastically change the way people live.  

    For example, the refinement of the combustion engine resulted in trains and cars and trucks and so on.

    But then people will slowly make minor changes as they settle into doing things the way they want, but with a given set of energy/idea input, eventually things stagnate.  

    The combustion engine keeps getting minor improvements, but it is somewhat stuck where it is, even to a degree blocking other types of motors from being fully explored.  Also, while they have seen large improvements, at their core, cars are not too different than in the beginning.

    It takes a period of explosive upheaval and development to create real change.

    Also, assuming we have 25 regular forum participants, and each of us is connected to several projects.  Then a new forum participant with a specific skill set has a 1-in-25 chance of making the critical connection necessary to plug into the community.

    If the project number stays the same, but the number of active participants increases evenly (such that there are three people to each project), then the likelihood increases to 3-in-75, which is not equal to 1-in-25 because effort is involved on both ends.

    However, if the number of projects and people working on projects stays the same, but numbers increase and the new people do not connect people to work, then the efficiency of the community has decreased.  If 15 new people came it would change it to a 1-in-40 chance.

    Finally, the size of OSE is directly connected to its ability to do what needs done.  At its present size, it is probably already doing what it can.  In order to do more, and in the long run, in order to have a big impact (such as being meaningful to anyone not a rural tinkerer in developed countries), it is necessary to develop a network large enough to support the complexity that would be necessary.

    (P.S. no clue on the odd formatting, I know other people have had the same problem and I have not seen it fixed by them.)
     
  • @ARGHanyes: Sorry in advance for poor formatting!

    :) You're spot on, and even pre-empted a couple points I'd planned for
    the next post. (The revolutionary aspect of large networks, and small
    networks' inhibitory pressures.) The numbers on your 'network value'
    example left me a bit fuzzy. I'll try a sample, too, and see where we
    go.


    Suppose you're telling the world about OSE. 1 in every 100 folks you
    meet is willing to drop everything and spend their life on it. Another 2
    in that 100 would happily visit for a Dedicated Project, and lend
    ongoing expertise. 3 more would be willing to assist from afar, and
    another 4 would just become True Fans, and tell their friends about it.
    The other 90 aren't that interested in helping, but 10 of them would use
    GVCS tools & tractors, if they were available. Another 20 would
    like to move to areas improved by the GVCS kit for social, ecological,
    and personal benefits, and 30 would end up benefiting from OSE being in
    their world. The other 30 are nimby bo-bo elitists. :)


    When you meet that first acolyte (1 in 100 chance), they're almost
    certain to bond (guaranteed connectivity). For that person, the value of
    being involved is priceless - say, $1,000. You have a network of 1 and a
    value to its members of $1,000. (I'm only counting the folks you
    enlist.) Until you find that one person, though, anyone else you meet
    probably won't take you seriously. Your network is too small for them to
    see value in it.


    Let's assume replacement for now (every time you ask, it's a new
    random sample, so your chances of each type appearing don't change as
    you sample). Once you have that first guy, we'll assume your network is
    sufficiently valuable for Dedicated Projects to be worth it. You have a 2
    in 100 chance of meeting those folks, the value to them is less than
    the devotee ($500?), and their probability of forming all possible
    connections is lower (they don't work with everyone in OSE, maybe just
    80%?). Any time they connect with another member, they add value to both
    memberships ($50 per bond?). $1000 + 2($500) + 0.8(3)($50) = $2,220
    network value.


    Assuming that's enough value for the next batch, you'd have a 3%
    chance of getting each of those distant CAD crunchers, who see $250 in
    value up front, connect 60% of the time, and add $25 to each connection
    they make. With 3 of them, there are now six members and 15 connections;
    the first three links were 'tight' bonds between old timers, and the 12
    new connections were forms of assistance and support. Add 3($250) +
    0.6(12)($25) to network value -> $2,220 + $930 = $3,150.


    Next, you get 4 True Fans, 4% chance each, who find value of $125,
    connect 40% of the time (they have a life outside work?), and add $12.50
    to their connections. 4($125) + 0.4(30)($12.50) + $3,150 = $3,800.
    Finally,
    the TED talk airs, and folks start ordering tractors! 10 folks, valuing
    the network at $75 each, connect 20% of the time, and add a meager
    $6.25 to connections. 10($75) + 0.2(145)($6.25) + $3,800 = $4,731.25 
    (Notice that '(145)' - connectivity is rising fast, but it's adding
    less.)

    Your tractor crews have plowed the states, and 20 people join those
    communities. $37.50 each, 10% connect, adding $3.125 (yeah, I can break
    pennies in half). 20($37.50) + 0.1(590)($3.125) + $4,731.25 = $5,665.625
    (Each new community member has about 4 connections, adding $12.50 to
    the network... this idea of 'value per person' comes up when we remove
    our earlier assumptions of replacement & critical value, and start
    to add costs of connecting!)
     
  • The last 30 people get a free ride on the planet you saved. They
    value this at $18.75. (Dinner for two?), and they don't bother to
    connect (you-tubers and trolls...). Add a measly 30($18.75), to get a
    network value of $6,228.125. Here's where Dunbar returns: that's the
    'net-worth' per 100 people, assuming full capture of all potential
    value. But, how many people did you have to meet, before you've captured
    that network? This is the cost of spreading into lower-margin markets.
    For a 1 in 100 chance of another life-time OSEer, that's $1,000 of
    value. ('$10 per click' in web-ad lingo)  And, if you got a couple of
    them together, their connectivity adds even more value! Finding those
    ten tractor owners took another 100 'hits' -> $7.50 per click. But,
    the tractor owners can only add $6.25 to their connections. There are
    ten times as many of them as there are acolytes, so their 20%
    connectivity means tractor guys fill up twice as many connections as
    lifers. As you add more marginal players to the network, the
    individual's attention to connectivity and quality of connection can't
    keep up. (Dunbar said 150 friends is the limit.) The probability of
    valuable connections being found drops. One lifer knows two tractor
    guys, and gets $12.50 out of it, INSTEAD of knowing two other lifers,
    and adding $200 to the network. The value of connection is diluted.
    Wikipedia survives on this awareness: I type a song into youtube, and
    get three pages of people playing covers, but can't find the original!
    Wikipedia's sourcing criteria, and heavy moderating, make it a 'haven
    for expertise' that ensures a high-value connection between knowledge
    and need. It doesn't want the other 80% of people writing blurbs and
    opinions on its pages. At some point, it's not worth it to you, to
    capture that last bit of the network. If casual newbies just lower the
    likelihood of valuable connections, without adding resources, why
    bother? We should stick to our passions, and not try to rope-in
    unwilling or disinterested folks.


    Next, let's remove that clumsy assumption from earlier: that one
    acolyte, and two Dedicated Project goers, added enough to the network
    for it to be worth someone joining as a CAD guy. If that's not enough
    membership, you'll have to keep looking for more project folks, before
    you accumulate enough value to lure CADies. What's their barrier to
    entry? The cost per click of reaching them, and the opportunity cost of
    'diluting' your network, (not a problem for CAD folks - we need more of
    them! this refers to the casual troll) both discourage you from
    bothering. On their end, it's the opportunity cost of involvement. They
    have other, valuable ways to use their time. (once you learn CAD, your
    life is full of fun stuff, right?) If you've let your network dilute,
    and THEN go looking for motivated assistance, they might say, "These
    boards are clogged, and I have trouble finding folks who actually need
    my skills." Pizza and netflix sound better to me, too. Experts &
    fanatics form club-organizations to have a greater chance of meeting
    like-minded people. Their critical question is: what level of membership
    will connect people at the greatest rate of value? And, on the other
    side, potential members ask: which memberships should I focus on, for
    greatest rate of value? I'm not sure all 20 of those 'willing to move,
    because of $37.50 in value' families would choose to move, once the
    costs of disruption, transaction, and the potential opportunities of NOT
    moving were included. And, if the 10 tractor-wannabees are scattered
    around the globe, transaction costs and risk would weigh heavy against
    trying a new technique. So, as the value of the network drops, you're
    more likely to loose portions of that potential user group to
    opportunity costs, transaction costs, and risk. Other options are worth
    more, to them.


    Removing the remaining assumption, replacement sampling, gives us a
    better view of the whole world system: as more devotees join, there will
    be fewer folks of that stripe left to attract. (Er, that's assuming we
    don't inspire more life-long members, which is totally unrealistic. But
    change in population parameters makes it a time series, and a non-linear
    one at that. I don't wanna bother.) So, when we're quickly absorbing
    the pool of project-builders and CAD men, (it sounds so suave, that
    way...) we'll hit a wall - either switch to the lower-yield, diluting
    groups, and potentially deter future lifers, or slow expansion. This
    will probably be a real concern in a year and a half; we might as well
    plan for it. I can picture a few extremes: "Yeah, we built a lot of
    tractors, because tons of orders came in. But we didn't have time to
    train anyone, and why bother, when we weren't getting enough folks
    developing new projects? Now, a lot of people see us as a brand." "We
    had a few focused people working full-time, and a small crew finished
    prototypes that we could demonstrate at conferences around the world.
    That got the engineers talking, and there are dozens of OS hardware
    sites using our tools and concepts. We're still waiting to see
    wide-spread use." "There was a media blitz, funding flooded in, and they
    expected results fast. We were a small crew, so we had to spend around
    to get rolling faster. It just attracted leeches, and led to costly
    errors." I don't think we're headed in any of those directions. We'll be
    balancing somewhere in the middle - the planning involves finding were
    exactly to balance.
     
  • Dense Networks, and Energy Density

    The analogy between
    technology and ecology isn't perfect: life is stuck in one spot,
    information travels. A photo that can hop around the world in less than a
    second has 'more distant dispersal' than a flower that can only cast
    seeds around it. But a single flower can disperse thousands of copies of
    its seed, while a photo might only be seen by a few people.
    ('dispersion rate') These two concepts are critical for bridging the gap
    between technology and ecology. (Notice, also, that a single photo
    MIGHT be seen by millions of people - showing higher dispersion rate
    than a flower. But that's because it was dispersed widely - most of
    those thousand flower seeds won't find a good spot to land. If they all
    did, their seed harvest would be in the millions, too. And, the photo
    was probably dispersed along many more steps in its chain - you see a
    Tumblr photo from a friend of a friend of a friend of a friend, because
    there's little cost to extending your network. If it's costly to
    coordinate long chains, the photo only spreads locally; you show your
    baby Polaroids to folks who come by, but your friends' Facebook photos
    of you are being compiled for image-recognition databases the world
    over.)

    With these concepts of 'dispersion distance' and
    'dispersion rate', we're almost ready to tackle an ecology's energy density. :) The theme
    for this half of the "small network" analysis is: while isolated
    clusters can be more diverse, certain KINDS of forms will only appear in
    large, dense networks. That's not the same as 'complexity in large
    networks', nor 'value in large networks', and I'll get into why and how.
    It means, instead, that certain forms aren't 'worth it' to small,
    diffused, or costly networks... and this can lead to a cul de sac. (If
    your island is too small for a herd of ruminant herbivores, you don't
    get exposed to their potential impacts (good & bad), and you create
    local solutions that 'wall-off' the system from finding ANY value in
    later importation of grazers.) The really important, game-changing
    structures, like mitochondria, sexual reproduction, and flowers, all
    came from exposure to a new KIND of form or circumstance. Whenever a
    game-changing form appears, it shifts the large-scale system behavior,
    pushing a new rule down onto the smaller scale. Once a land mass is big
    enough for elephants, trees are in for it. Flowering grasses are
    probably the only plants that like elephants, and they wouldn't have
    spread so well, or appeared at all, if we only had islands full of
    coconuts. To allow for new game-changers to appear, we have to ensure a
    network large and dense enough for their triggering events. Otherwise,
    we'll become wealthy manor farmers, who wouldn't see any value in
    cutting through our vineyards to lay a state highway. New possibility,
    one of the OS metrics I'd mentioned originally, dies. To put it
    poetically, 'Our wealth impinges upon us, making us fear revolution.'
    Islands don't revolt, they just become incompatible with each other the
    more they specialize. This specialization has value for them, so their
    wealth grows, but incompatibility creates a stagnant macro-system. China
    tried that, I'd rather not. ("Individuals will happily march toward
    system-wide cul de sacs.")

    So, islands can be more valuable (at first!) to the individual, than a mainland. But the mainland takes the risks necessary for valuable revolutions, which is our best hope for raising equilibrium diversity. (Even if the revolution only happens once every 500 million years, or so.) On top of that, islands are almost always more complex than mainlands. Give equal area and energy to a mainland as you do to a group of islands, and the islands will have greater total species diversity, ("another finch?!") greater stability of species diversity, and each species will last more 'lives-spanned'. Imagine: a virus hits the mainland; same virus hits one island. (More on 'islanding' reactions to parasitism, in Section 4: "Malthusian collapse is a component of system fidelity".) For the same reason we're moving toward multi-cropping, islands help protect species from going extinct. Is that complexity the same as an increase in possibility? Not really - two different ferns, on two different islands, fulfilling the same niche in different places, don't interact, and if they did, wouldn't create anything different from themselves. But the mainland has elephants. :) That's where flowers come from. (Please don't tell people: "This means large networks keep creating revolutions." It's the opposite syllogism: "You can't have a revolution without a large network." Not as cheery, but honest.)

    I've been ignoring those 'dispersion' qualities I'd mentioned at the top. Here's were we jump in: we've been trekking across Canada for weeks, eating as much green grass as we can find, (before everyone else!) and this wolf just attacks me. What a waste: my fetus was a transport weight and food expense for my mom caribou, I spent all the energy I got from milk and grass just walking here, and all the grass that would have grown if it'd been spared my appetite is going to compost in my gut, because wolves don't eat grass. Lets take a vacation: you've hung from the same tree your whole life. Once a week, you crawl to the ground to poop (it's rude, if stuff lands on people below) - and you are covered in the same moss as the branches around you, like a wobbly photocell. Bugs and birds don't mind you; you nibble on leaves for a bit, letting them digest for 30 days, which is manageable for you, because you don't have far to travel. The beetles and moths and ants around you carry away dead stuff before you noticed it was withering, and flick the pollen back and forth that makes your favorite fruit buds. Life is easy. Why marry young?

    Post Break!
     
  • The Melancholy Tangent

    Caribou huddle together in a cold, dim place - food is thin on the
    ground, and they have to travel far to have enough. But, to travel far,
    you need an efficient way of getting around; stubby, warm little mole
    arms won't do. And traveling so far takes a lot of energy, too - you
    have to travel further, to get the extra fuel for all that traveling,
    AND you have to carry all this extra food in your gut, while traveling.
    Better invest in a gut-upgrade. That's costly, though; to be efficient,
    you have to specialize. More travel, because you're avoiding
    non-specialist foods. Pretty soon, it's a migration. From the standpoint
    of diversity, a migration is good: when a species lets a region 'rest',
    then floods in periodically, (and predictably, or else it's
    disastrous!) predators can't gorge themselves fast enough, and there are
    still plenty of migrants left over. One kind of cicada rests for 13
    years underground, before hatching to breed, lay, and die. By avoiding
    12 years of metabolic requirements, that cicada can squeeze its food
    needs onto a ecology that would otherwise be too small for such a large
    population. (Remember the problem with elephants, compared to flies: a
    pound of flies is enough to sustain the species, but elephants need tons
    of tonnes. Cicadas, by slowing their metabolic impact, need less than
    they 'should', so they can get away with a total biomass that other bugs
    can't match.) But caribou don't 'rest' like cicadas and grizzlies. The
    benefit of their migration is to spread their area of collection, and
    connect widely separated patches of food that would be too small or
    unreliable on their own to support a whole species. Patchy desolation
    can't feed a local grazer, but it could help feed passing migrations.
    The caribou increase their dispersion radius, to eek out a marginal fit. (Dandelions are considered weeds, because they disperse into every
    little crack. If there's a disaster, the herbs along the river might all
    die, but at least a few dandelions were somewhere safe, and by next
    spring, they're everywhere.) But, there's a cost to the caribou
    migration: when they eat the grass, they stunt it, and food is scarce,
    so any grass they find, they eat. And the wolves following the herd are
    hungry, too - if they find a calf, they eat it. The valuable investments
    of the grass (leaves) and caribou (young) are destroyed, just to
    transmit energy and nutrients through the system.

    Compare the sloth's life: he doesn't have to travel far, so thick and fuzzy works well & stays comfortable. He can specialize his gut without weight constraint: his belly usually holds half his mass. And, because he's not killing his tree, the trees end up growing bigger and more abundantly than they would if surrounded by a herd of migrant grazers. (Elephants!) On top of that, his protected home is nurtured by the life cycles of other animals, and he benefits without paying the moths or ants. Sloths are so still and quiet, they don't worry much about predators, either. What's the risk? Over-abundance. In some areas of the rainforest, sloths make up half the total biomass. (take that, cicada.) They're not likely to die out from catastrophe, but a parasite mite be bad. To avoid the risk of dense, diseased populations, sloths expose themselves to unnecessary risks: if the only things that eat you run along the ground, and you live in trees, it's dangerous waddling the forest floor at two yards a minute just to pee. Being really slow saves energy, allowing more sloths to squeeze onto the same energy 'footprint', cicada-style, but also makes it hard for them to adapt to local changes, and they become the backup meal for others, if there is a disaster. The sloths choose these local risks, so that their numbers aren't managed by catastrophic waves of disease, instead. Better to have one die here or there, than periodically lose the whole population. (Their solitary habits are also essential for limiting disease transmission; if sloths moved in herds, parasites would find a way to eat them. Their poop piles help mates locate one another, but even then, they can go multiple years without contact.) Limiting dispersal, and localizing risk & variation, keeps the sloth from harm. These are illustrations of the parasite dynamics I touched on, in the original post: parasites limit growth, either through collapse, or by pressuring species to develop an alternative. Which do you prefer?

    So, caribou and sloths have found different ways to make a living - why no sloths in Canada, or caribou in Columbia? Energy density. Energy is scarce up north, requiring a migration. Energy is dense in the tropics, so you can feed a sedentary species. The tropics don't trade energy density for dispersal; monarch butterflies travel far, and have an awful lay-over. But, the sedentary species are more abundant than the dispersers. Does that mean sedentary is 'more fit'? Not exactly - it's more efficient, so a greater biomass of sedentary species can be supported on the SAME amount of energy. It's not certain whether more system energy is flowing to sedentary or dispersive species. (At what point does one become the other? A mile? Ten?) But, in general, it is true that dispersal is greater the further you get from the equator, or the more local climates fluctuate. Dispersal is 'fit for catastrophe and recovery cycles', sedentism is 'fit for packing tightly and cheaply without disease'. Whether OSE plans to operate in a future of energy scarcity (become a nomadic herder) or dense biomass, (invest in Chinese real estate) this framework informs us in the choice, and the conditions that effect it.

    Can we increase the energy density? Not thermodynamically; we can't make something from nothing. But, if we find 'waste' that we can recycle, that energy is ours, to feed our species footprint. Suppose we herd those caribou, guide them to good pasture, protect their young, and tame the wolf? We could even make cheese from their milk, for our winter supply, and our wolf-pets would share. No more over-grazing a spot, until erosion destroys it. No young lost to wolves, or stampedes during grazing time. And, if our hunt-harvesting and control is the 'risk' sloths need to avoid catching colds, they'll be happy to feed us. I recommend the short film "The Man Who Planted Trees" - you can find it on YouTube. The more we devote our attention and insight to our world, the more we find those little losses, leaks, and worn down spots, and fix them. As tool-making migratory social omnivores, we're in a great position to choose our own limits to growth, and extract new 'value streams' from ecology that simpler species missed. Oops, that was kinda the 'islanding' behavior I meant to save for later. Anyhoo.
     
  • Also, I've been tossing OSE-related (and a bit off-topic...) thoughts together in the wiki: Anthony Repetto/Concept Log ... I'll be sub-paging each topic; the log is for summaries. And, I'll be throwing the topics into the forums, and keeping track of the forum gems in the log.
     
  • I found that to be interesting and digestible.  On a related and unrelated note, sloths are my favorite animals.

    In thinking about the photo and the flower concept, I think that the hardware-information that we are transmitting has the additional value of being able to evolve and change (unlike the photograph, which has locked value).  Similar to the flower, it remains largely the same, but it changes to adapt itself to environments, thereby spreading itself more effectively.
     
  • Yay! I'll keep trying for clarity. Let me know when I stray. :)

    And ditto, for the sloth. Pangolins have a similar attitude -  I hope they stick around. The photo tangent opens up some interesting ideas: as memory continues to get cheaper, while Moore's Law dies quietly, the balance in computing is shifting to databases and clouds. (migrate the answer, rather than grow one locally) And, we can't command the diversity that arrives; new possibility leads to all the ontologically fit (that is 'fit, throughout its growth') forms it allows, not just the ones we'd like. Not to say that photo editors will cause any harm; they just allow a lot of stuff you don't find interesting. (diversity -> incompatibility & dilution) The 'fat tail' extends, and we're less likely to find a photo relevant to our needs, on the massive database of photos. If photo-editing becomes cheaper and easier, (higher mutation rate) more 'marginal value' editing occurs, (celebrity porn hoax, anyone?) and the network is diluted. (a drop in average 'fitness', making it easier for clumsy competitors to survive, like Stag Beetles) Unless we have improved ways to search and sort information, (a new, marginal tech species is born - Tumblr) the marginal value of the network drops, and it hits a limit to growth. I think that's in line with Daniel T's point - 'improvements' pull for support species, and become reliant on them. If the system experiences shock, those marginal species drop out, and the improvement has to re-align, which is costly. As a technology-sharing platform, the internet is convenient, but Open Source can be done by mail, too. The revolution was in CNC machines and 3D printers; internet collaboration lowers the transaction costs of gathering and discussing OS hardware, like an elephant spreading flowers. (lower cost -> many-chain networks, more connected, higher network $) If we became dependent on the internet for our OS work, however, (only having information online?) we'd feel a shock, and have to re-align the organization, if the internet became too expensive. My concern about cul de sacs is: if a village has tractors and houses, and all it needs, those local values preclude demand for an internet. Why bother making elephants? With peak oil hanging over us, expensive equipment and energy costs are hard to justify. A HAM radio is cheaper than the installation fee for your Comcast - OS toolkits could be shared by coordinating via radio. For countries that can't expect the 'last mile' to reach them, radio is probably the cheap, efficient, and sufficient solution. But, like Mao in the 50's, local self-sufficiency creates a distaste for investing in a huge, risky new ventures, and those exciting new flowers wouldn't appear. Viral Eukaryogenesis is my rough view of humanity's future relationship with life: viral parasites like to invade, take control of a cell's machinery, make copies of themselves, and blow up the factory. (Slash-and-Burn?) Wasteful, like a wolf eating a calf. The cells themselves, to avoid these parasites, had over-speciated. (A higher mutation rate is a risk - more fatality from poor fit, more waste from devolution; but that's the risk they choose, to avoid catastrophic collapse.) This meant they weren't compatible with each other, (they 'turtled-up' in their low-dispersion genetic islands) and the macro-system couldn't make 'flowers'. The 'elephant' that changed it all: a virus that, when it invaded the host, didn't make copies of itself and explode... Instead, it started piloting the cell around! If it could instruct the cell, making it more effectual, that cell's success would be shared by the virus. Virus became shepherd, and now we have nuclei. Crossover homology (two animals have to be nearly identical, genetically, to have viable sexual reproduction) is one of our 'value-stream bottlenecks', because it only allows adjacent mutations to mingle. (A lamprey's beneficial mutation can't hop to an ear of corn.) Intelligent gardeners can apply selection and combination, constraining the ontological cacophony of islands, to extract functional differences from them, not just niche-variations. This creates 'islands of experimentation'. (local barriers to dispersion help avoid collapse, while raising rate of new species) The value of communication and transport is, in that case, to transmit the useful innovations across the whole network quickly. Information is lighter than other resources, so it won't cost much to maintain, and we'll probably get out of the habit of transporting anything else. As long as our means to coordinate and organize globally aren't lost or diluted, I'm all for city-states. :) From the perspective of viral eukaryogenesis, those 'diverse island cities', by networking and coordinating to exchange high-value site-specific goods and complete the occasional massive industrial project, but spending the majority of their energy on local homeostasis, are like organs in a body. Right now, humanity is more like a slime mold. The change would mean increased urbanization, (energy density & diversity) AND increased investment in the land. (localizing risk, to avoid catastrophic parasites) To prevent snobby vineyards from dragging down the plans for a canal or railroad, the structure we adopt has to have a way for accounting global externalities. Otherwise, people will see more value in local investment, only - you profit from the benefits you create locally, but you're not likely to profit from benefits created far away. OS Capitalism, Task mobs, and resource currencies, are all attempts to break the corporate globalization model, but I'm worried that the structure best for 'surviving in a corporate world' might not be the best structure to 'keep in an OS world', especially if they raise long-range coordination costs, which lower your chance of investing in global benefits.


     
  • I am reminded to some degree of Douglas Adams' idea that in an infinite universe everything eventually happens, no matter how remote the possibilities.

    Also, I think the most significant impetus for intellectual evolution is boredom.  Even a small community with all of its basic needs met will eventually have someone that says "What if...?" a few too many times and will them change everything for everyone.
     
  • :) I'm all for boredom, btw - "Boredom is the sensation of withdrawal from our addiction to distractions." And humans have incredible insight - we keep making good guesses about things we've never experienced. But, if the economic possibilities are limited, the 'what if' never gets off the ground. Even a working model isn't enough - folks in half a dozen countries had all they needed for a steam-powered industrial age, in the 1500 years before the midlands of England finally did it. The abundance of slaves precluded any value in steam, for the Greeks and Turks, and the Chinese had such a dense population, they worried more about resource-saving technology, not labor-saving.

    Interesting tangent on infinite universes & remote possibility: even with an infinite universe, there's no guarantee of finding every physical possibility; it could be a universe of repeating chess boards, without a single duck. (Infinite space, but repetition of finite components) And, because each thing present got that way through a history, an infinite universe will only display what is historically natural. (This means, aside from the physical laws of local events, there's an 'emergent' macro-scale law restricting the possibility of observable histories.) So, we might imagine an object or event that, if it did exist, wouldn't violate physics; but never in the whole universe does the history allow it to come into being. A good example: the grandfather paradox. People die all the time, and the result for some is that, the grandchildren they would have had never come into being. We all have grandfathers, so some people with grandfathers won't become grandfathers themselves. But, can you be killed by your grandson, before your own son is conceived? Physical laws don't restrict having kids, or killing people, or time travel. But, add them together, and you get an ontological no-no... which has now been demonstrated, experimentally. (http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1005/1005.2219v1.pdf) You can travel back in time, and meet your grandpa... even have a long conversation, tell him about cool stuff in the future, etc... but, if you try to kill him, SOMETHING will stop you. Either the gun misfires, or you change your mind, or it turns out you're the offspring of the milk man... There's only one time stream, and it's already decided. All future time travel is already included in the past we recall; those time travelers only succeeded in making the past as it is, never changing it. (So, if grandpa bought stock based on the cool future you'd told him about... that would only have been what already happened. "Gramps had invested in all these weird stocks, decades ago, and made millions... I never realized, but he did that because I'd gone back in time, two years from now, and told him which stocks to pick. I guess I'll be busy time-traveling, soon!" Twelve Monkeys still gives me chills.)

    One of the more bizarre effects of this: suppose you leave your house one morning, and your future self is standing by the gate! He says, "this document is of vital importance - the president has to see it!" You take that paper to the White House, and as you're leaving, a man on the street says "Step right up, be the first to try the newly invented time machine!" You hop through, and find yourself at your front gate, just as your old self is leaving. You say, "this document is of vital importance - the president has to see it!" But, who wrote the paper? Objects and events can appear within the time stream, WITHOUT CAUSE, as long as they're self-consistent. And, in general, there is no cause or effect. Just self-consistency.

    The way I think of this is with a visual: you have a ruler, painted red on one half of its length, blue on the other half. An ant is walking (forward through time) from the red side, to the blue, and gets to the edge: "Whoa! Red just turned blue - how can that be? What caused red to become blue, when it was all just red, before? How can blue appear without cause?!" Meanwhile, an ant on the blue side was walking the other way: "Heck, all the blue is gone. That makes no sense. Where could it go, and where did all this red come from?" The ruler is consistent: it's red on half, blue on half. Those two halves just happen to be past and future, so for an awareness moving through time, the boundary between them seems to be 'a miracle of creation'. As far as I can tell, the entire universe is just a self-consistent, causeless blip. Symmetric crystals already map onto quantum theory (Lisi proved this for E8 group, hypothesized it for the 'yet-to-be-solved' E12, and my crystal symmetry construction algorithm tells the rest of that story...) so the argument goes like this: the Cosmos is just the largest self-consistent crystal symmetry, 'the Monster'. Local regions of this huge self-consistency are perceived as space and time by the operator fluxions within it (us), and the local 'physics' is the crystal fragment within our light veil (the particular mapping of E12 that we see in our 12bil.-light-year snow globe). If we traveled to a place outside the light veil (though we can't, as the grandfather constraint keeps them separate), the physical laws would be different, though they'd create another self-consistent kind of reality. This 'Fate' means we might be able to manage short, local bursts of faster-than-light-travel, but in general, we can't hop to the edge of our current vision.

    This has a good tie-in with Kurt Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. Godel was worried about math - you start with a few assumptions, apply logic, and get truth. But, will you be able to prove, from those assumptions alone, ALL truths? (mathematical 'completeness') And, will those assumptions ever lead to a contradiction? (mathematical 'consistency') He showed that ALL maths are either Consistent AND Incomplete, or Inconsistent AND Complete. Ouch - any math that ONLY gives truth, can't give every truth. And any math that gives EVERY truth, also gives you lies. So, which are we? Each local math we create is consistent (we only choose to use the consistent ones...) but reality is COMPLETE. (It does contain the truths our local maths can't always prove...) The argument: reality is an INCONSISTENT AND COMPLETE math. Local portions of this math won't contain contradictions - the paradoxes are spaced widely apart, on the opposite sides of the cosmos. What separates them? The speed of light is the universe's way of keeping the paradoxes from ever touching. Within any local light veil, you can't find paradox. But, the universe as a whole contains them all. To do this, the universe can't be any old arrangement of truths - there are so many paradoxes, you have to place them very carefully, to keep them ALL from touching. The only structure that does this well is the symmetry crystal I'd mentioned: the 196,883-dimensional Fischer-Griess Monster. (The cosmos is a giant, greasy fish monster? Cuthulu, I knew you'd come back!) So, that very particular arrangement of symmetric paradoxes is the 'Fate' that we can't avoid, and the reason why you have to be nice to your grandfather. :)
     
  • Apologies, for straying wide off topic, btw! I hope Daniel T. can find some solace, knowing we're happy to discuss his concerns.  :)
     
  • Vote Up0Vote Down
    kimp
     
    October 2011
    Keeping it simple. If you reduce the number of items shipped from local to local, and produce goods locally from raw materials, then every community edges towards independence. We can look at early colonial American and Farming. However, it is either local self sufficiency, nor global interconnected specialization which leads to an optimum but both. We can't separate ourselves from location, therefore we should take into account that location can provide advantages over other locations and act on specialization within those communities. You are not going to drill for oil on a Manhattan street.  You can grow more potatoes than a small community can consume. However some raw goods are have pluri potential. Like stem cells, the raw material can be morphed into many products. If we can automate transportation of these goods and reduce both the energy and labor required, then costs follows the real scarcity value of the items.  As to metals, Aluminum is the most abundant metal, the cost is mostly the energy cost associated with processing. Clean affordable energy, combined with automation can reduce the cost, and increase the availability, and in many cases minimize transportation issues.

    The industrial revolution brought increased production at a lower cost because labor costs were reduced by mechanization. So automation and mechanization combined with inexpensive renewable energy brings even greater possibilities for lowering production costs while increasing production.

    90% of the effort becomes the design and production of the first unit, thereafter, it can be copied in the 1,000's of units inexpensively.

    That is the idea behind distributed production. There will still be the need for specialized production facilities but they are minimized, and used for large items, and or a market niche, and correspondingly are expensive unless transportation costs can be made inexpensive, and there is wide global demand.  However, just like the PC revolution which took us from Mainframes, to general purpose machines that we have today, general manufacturing machines, which can output parts such as dinner plates, clothing, shoes, a valve for a pump, can all be localized, and then you need only transport raw materials in bulk locally. The maximizes the return on the transportation network, and design can be distributed cheaply via the network.

    The net result is the reduction in the number of people needed to sustain current production capacity.  The real problem comes because resources such as land are finite, and real scarcity will impact the number of people who can own land in choice locations, and control the raw resources.

    As to raw materials, this will create an incentive to come up with alternative materials, but the location issue is intractable. 

    We need community owned lands, and wise land management.  Land held in trust without individual ownership sounds like a simple answer at first blush, but it is more complicated than that. Choice locations will see demand both internally from increased population, and from the outside moving in. Also land allocation becomes critical both for the community, and the individual.  Providing individual liberty and at the same time looking at community sustainability, are not easy problems. Technology will not be able to deliver us from humanities selfish nature, we will not rid poverty, rather, we can reduce the impact of poverty. I am a technologist. So the following admission is difficult for me. The path to ending poverty starts not with technology, but population control. Planned parenthood and reversing population growth are more important than technology towards ending poverty. Until we have the ability to terraform planets and colonize space.
     
  • Vote Up0Vote Down
    MetzMetz
     
    October 2011
    . To sum up in a few sentences, we are on the verge of the next industrial tech revolution. We went from agrarian, short supply chain , to industrial long supply chain, and coming back to ultra short supply chain with manufacture on demand, open source products.
     
  • Metz : "ultra short supply chain with manufacture on demand, open source products."
    Sounds like the village blacksmith!
    Iron age man found iron from stone or sand after bon fire cooled down.  From this tools were formed (spear heads), the good hunters got more food. Later in bronze age ploughs were cast (recently dug up in the U.K.) Looks like what we used late 1800's!!
    Around here the desk and paper jockeys cannot and don't know that a shovel needs sharpening! 
    The "doer" smith makes a living again and will be appreciated. 

     
  • Vote Up0Vote Down
    mjnmjn
     
    October 2011
    Blacksmithing is a skill that can be learned by yourself or from books, but it's better to take courses locally, if they are offered.  Building a shop requires a bit of capital, largely for an anvil.  The blacksmith is unique among craftsmen in that he can make most of his own tools.  I have a basic blacksmith shop that includes anvil, forge, leg vice and a a complement of tools  You don't really need all that much.

    To me, the interesting thing is to explore how the GVCS tool set can enhance or expand the capabilities of a modern smith.  A power hammer run from a power cube is something of great interest to me.  The iron worker tool is another, though I don't need one on the scale currently envisioned.  The welding tools are also of interest to me.

    My shop has been in storage for many years, but I'm thinking of setting it up again and augmenting it with new tools.  I have the space for it (though perhaps not as much time as I'd like).  It would be fun to work with hot metal again.

    - Mark

     

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